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Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between
Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping
Studies Today
PHILIP CUNLIFFE
The sheer ambition and scale of UN peacebuilding today inevitably invokes comparison
with historic practices of colonialism and imperialism, from critics and supporters of
peacebuilding alike. The legitimacy of post-settlement peacebuilding is often seen to
hinge on the question of the extent to which it transcends historic practices of imperialism.
This article offers a critique of how these comparisons are made in the extant scholarship,
and argues that supporters of peacekeeping deploy an under-theorized and historically
one-sided view of imperialism. The article argues that the attempt to flatter peacebuilding
by comparison with imperialism fails, and that the theory and history of imperialism still
provide a rich resource for both the critique and conceptualization of peacekeeping
practice. The article concludes by suggesting how new forms of imperial power can be
projected through peacebuilding.
This article reassesses the discussion of imperialism in the literature on UN peace-
building. In particular, it sets out to re-examine the various ways in which modern
peacebuilding operations are differentiated from forms of neo-imperial rule.1 The
discussion proceeds by identifying the types of distinctions that are made between
peacebuilding operations and imperialism within the scholarly literature. I
examine the conceptual and logical integrity, and historical validity, of claims
to the effect that modern peacebuilding operations possess certain distinctive
attributes that raise peacebuilding above imperialism. These claims are unconvin-
cing because they rely on under-theorised and historically impoverished under-
standings of empire. A more profound understanding of peacebuilding and
peacekeeping can be gained by drawing more deeply on a rich tradition of imperi-
alist theorizing in the discipline of international relations.
The geographic extent of UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world,
the transformative intent of peacebuilding and the political reach that peace-
builders extend in the course of their operations makes imperialism an obvious
benchmark with which to gauge the role and place of peacebuilding in inter-
national affairs today. But while the question of whether or not peacekeeping/
peacebuilding mirrors imperialism is often raised, it is also with ritualistic predict-
ability equally often summarily dismissed. The question is important because it
raises broad concerns about the purpose and rationale of peacekeeping in
world order. Nor is the question merely abstract. The extent to which peacebuild-
ing can be differentiated from imperialism is directly used to legitimize
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peacebuilding operations. Although there are a greater variety of voices in peace-
building debates than ever before extending to post-colonial, Foucauldian and
critical theory perspectives, imperialism remains under-theorized and under-
utilized in the study of peacekeeping. While much invoked as a concept, it is
seldom systematically deployed in peacekeeping debates. Thus the spectre of
imperialism that scholars of peacebuilding conjure with is more powerful than
they realize, and as shown below, attempts to exorcize it to date have failed.
The focus of this article is on what Roland Paris termed ‘post-settlement
peacebuilding’ (his definition is discussed below). At least since the US-led inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003, empire has returned to the core of debates in international
relations. While imperial power is more easily identified in those peacebuilding
operations that are directly tied to the political interests and military initiatives
of a powerful state – such as with US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan –
‘post-settlement peacebuilding’ as opposed to ‘post-conquest peacebuilding’ is
widely believed to possess attributes that distinguish it from outright imperialism
or the more dubious and militarily robust ‘post-conquest’ operations.
While Paris concedes that ‘all peacebuilding missions involve a measure of
foreign intrusion in domestic affairs’, he maintains that ‘destroying a regime
through external invasion is hardly equivalent, in degree or kind, to deploying
a mission at the request of local parties with the goal of [implementing] a peace
settlement’.2 At the very least it can be said that questions of imperial power
are more ambiguous when it comes to these cases of post-settlement peacebuild-
ing. Simply put, post-settlement peacebuilding is the ‘hard case’ for questions of
imperialism. Thus although not sharing Paris’ confidence that post-settlement and
post-conquest peacebuilding operations can be so easily distinguished, in this
article I am not seeking to draw out these similarities, but rather to scrutinise
the case made for those supposedly redeeming features of post-settlement peace-
building. I begin by providing some context for the discussion by briefly surveying
how imperialism has been repeatedly invoked – often with surprising bluntness –
in discussion of peacekeeping, and how this reflects changed attitudes to imperi-
alism and its legacy. I identify the stakes involved in analysing peacebuilding by
considering how such operations are legitimized in international politics. I then
analyse in more detail the ways in which peacebuilding is believed to resemble
imperialism, and the crucial factors seen to differentiate peacebuilding from
imperialism.
The claims made for the redeemed character of post-settlement peacebuilding
are clustered into arguments of two broad types: aims and modalities. In the first
case, the aims of peacebuilding are held to be a-strategic and therefore non-
imperial, while in the second case the modalities of peacebuilding – that it is mul-
tilateral and consensual – make it incompatible with empire-building projects. I
will show that the contemporary practices of peacebuilding are not only visible
in the historical record of European imperialism, but are also consistent with
neo-imperial theories of international order. The method therefore is that of
immanent critique. Rather than semantic jugglery or attempts to force discussion
of peacebuilding into pre-given definitions of empire, I expose the conceptual and

























historical shortcomings of those attempts to rescue peacebuilding from charges of
imperialism.
Peacekeeping Scholarship and the Study of Imperialism
One might expect that comparisons between modern day peacebuilding oper-
ations and imperial rule, colonialism and empire, would be controversial and bit-
terly contested. Empire after all, is widely seen to be a redundant and intrinsically
illegitimate form of political rule, while peacekeeping and peacebuilding is an
accepted and established international practice that has become ever more
widespread since the end of the cold war. Such an assumption would be
wrong: discussion of empire in peacekeeping studies is open and frank, even
among the staunchest supporters of peacebuilding.
Discussion of ‘liberal imperialism’ is rife, albeit most commonly in reference
to those operations and cases of intervention that, for whatever reason, have
been more prominent in the policy-making of Western capitals, as indicated by
the sub-title to Michael Ignatieff’s Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia,
Kosovo and Afghanistan.3 Even the viceroys of the new ‘liberal imperialism’
are unashamed of their role. ‘What we have [in Bosnia] is near-imperialism’,
Lord Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
told a British journalist, adding that his job incorporated ‘a Gilbert and Sullivan
title and powers that should make a liberal blush’ (though as the reporter noted,
Ashdown wasn’t blushing).4 According to Kimberly Marten, ‘[e]mpire and
peacekeeping have become intertwined as never before’.5 Indeed, it is possible
to identify a broad consensus within the literature that peacebuilding is near-
enough imperialism. . . nearly, but not quite. What are the crucial ingredients of
peacebuilding that distinguish it from imperialism?
First let us consider in what way peacebuilding can be compared to
imperialism. Roland Paris sketches out several issues: transformative peacebuilding
represents the dissemination of a distinctive, Western-inspired model of liberal
political and economic relations from the core to the periphery. This model is
variously diffused or implanted through peace settlements crafted with inter-
national support and containing internationally-sponsored provisions, alongside
the supply of expert advice and imposition of conditionalities and ‘proxy govern-
ance’ (where local functions and institutions of government are administered by
outside actors).6 According to Paris, this amounts to a new ‘standard of civilisation’
which states ‘must accept in order to gain full rights and the recognition of the
international community’.7 The old mission civilisatrice empowered the European
colonial states to impose their will on other territories; today similar sentiments
of benevolent reform drive peacebuilding, according to Paris.
Along similar lines, Marten says that ‘squeamishness’ about the imperial label
should not blind us to the utility of the analytic comparison.8 She compares what
she calls ‘complex peacekeeping’ and colonialism – mostly based on the similarity
of conflicts that early colonisers and today’s peacekeepers face: ‘[t]he tasks per-
formed by imperial soldiers in many ways match what is being asked of today’s


























unprecedented or out of the realm of military competence’.9 Michael Doyle and
Nicholas Sambanis suggest that ‘multidimensional peace operations entail’ a
‘quasi-colonial presence’.10
Simon Chesterman notes that the sheer scale of socio-political transformation
embodied in peacebuilding operations leaves colonialism and the military occu-
pations resulting out of the world wars as the only possible scale of comparison
for the most ambitious of UN peacebuilding operations. ‘Is it possible’, he asks,
‘to establish the conditions for legitimate and sustainable national governance
through a period of benevolent foreign autocracy?’11 Ignatieff has perhaps been
most explicit of all with his idea of ‘empire lite’: an empire because US interven-
tions abroad represent ‘an attempt to permanently order the world of states and
markets according to its national interests’,12 undertaken ‘for imperial reasons: to
consolidate its global hegemony, to assert and maintain its leadership and to
ensure stability in those zones essential to the security of itself or its allies’.13
These views are representative rather than exhaustive. There are several striking
aspects of this literature worth emphasising. First, peacebuilding is seen to be
similar to imperialism in several respects, notably that it involves outsiders promot-
ing a distinctive set of values, consonant with the reigning values of international
order, transforming societies up to and including the use of force if necessary.
Second, the aforementioned authors are all supportive of peacebuilding and inter-
national intervention, albeit to varying degrees andwith varying recommendations.
They do not represent radical opinion on the subject. It is this that, third, makes the
frank comparison with imperialism and colonialism all the more striking. For the
comparison between peacebuilding and imperialism is not a bitter concession
made by these authors in the course of a struggle with their critics where they
are forced to admit that peacebuilding is much like the derided (and illegal under
the terms of international law) practice of colonialism. Indeed, there is at least as
much ‘mainstream’ literature that makes the comparison between imperialism
and peacekeeping as there is critical literature.14 This indicates that the character
of peacebuilding today makes comparison with imperialism unavoidable.
Redeeming Peacekeeping
Part of the reason that the comparison between imperialism and peacebuilding
can be made so openly is because these varied analysts believe that peacebuilding
is different from imperialism in crucial respects. The arguments against imperial-
ism are marshalled along two axes – the aims of peacebuilding and its modalities.
But in the effort to exorcize imperialism and thereby redeem peacekeeping, the
defenders of peacekeeping summon a spectre more powerful than they realize.
For all the assumptions that supposedly differentiate peacebuilding from imperi-
alism can be challenged.
The Aims of Peacebuilding
Why are peacebuilding missions undertaken? Paris suggests that ‘European colo-
nialism was practised primarily to benefit the imperial states themselves’, while

























‘the motivation behind recent peacebuilding operations is less mercenary’.15 He
cites a variety of factors at play – the absence of theories of racial superiority
and the fact that operations are limited in time. (‘No imperialists have ever
been so impatient for quick results’ according to Ignatieff.)16 Paris even cites
the great liberal anti-imperialist John Hobson in support of his arguments, the
latter having supported the mission civilisatrice if it was to ‘secure the safety
and progress of. . . the world, and not the special interests of the interfering
nation. Such interference must be attended by an improvement and elevation of
the character of the people who are brought under this control’.17 The overriding
assumption here is that selfish motivations are the key problem to be avoided or
managed.
Yet to claim that peacekeeping is disinterested, while imperialism is self-inter-
ested, is perhaps the weakest of all ways to differentiate the two. For imperialism
was frequently justified by altruistic claims of spreading the benefits of progress
and modernity to backward peoples incapable of realizing their own self-
interests. So deeply engrained were the assumptions of imperial altruism that,
for example, Lord Frederick Lugard, the British imperial administrator and the-
orist of colonialism felt compelled to remind his readers that British colonialism
was not ‘based on motives of philanthropy only’.18 In other words, Lugard
assumed that his readers did not even consider the possibility that Britain was
advancing its own interests through colonial expansion. Liberal imperialism,
the idea that imperial rule is justified by the backwardness of its subjects, has
been a powerful legitimizing force for imperial expansion ever since the rise of
modernity. To assert that it is possible to partition peacebuilding from imperial-
ism on the basis that the former is altruistic and the latter self-interested would be
to ignore the history of imperialism, and to lack objectivity. Moreover, the
interests secured through peacebuilding operations seem close in their substance
and rationale to justifications given for imperialism.
Among the many reasons powering imperial expansion was the need to con-
solidate regional security and the need to prevent local conflicts from spilling over
into areas of imperial interest and influence. Such themes echo in peacekeeping
today, which is often justified by the need generally to neutralize the ‘externalities’
associated with conflict on the periphery of the states system. The need to main-
tain global security and order that underpins the justification for UN peacekeep-
ing would be familiar to imperial statesmen of yesteryear concerned with
protecting global interests, even if such interests are of a lesser order than those
more immediately tied to the direct use of military force associated with ‘post-
conquest’ peacebuilding operations.
As regards the relationship between imperial political economy and peace-
keeping/ peacebuilding, it is a vast topic beyond the scope of this article. But
some observations are possible about the character of the claims made regarding
economic interests in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Michael Gilligan and
Stephen J. Steadman have averred that the geography of peacekeeping deploy-
ments does not correlate with an imperial geopolitics, whether or not for the pur-
poses of ensuring outside access to supplies of raw materials and primary


























influence that states had hitherto jealously defended against external interven-
tion.19 That peacekeepers have encroached on traditional great power spheres
of influence – such as the US ‘backyard’ of Central America – is indeed note-
worthy. To imagine that this nullifies imperialism would be to stretch credulity,
however, as it would be to assume that great powers cannot bend the UN to
their will. Reading these interventions against the grain, it could be argued that
UN legitimacy has been purposefully stretched by great powers in order to legit-
imate, and thereby buttress, their imperial interventions in their traditional
spheres of influence; Haiti is a case in point.20
Considered against the backdrop of imperial history, the assumption that the
absence of valuable raw materials disproves imperialism is an odd one. The fact
that the European empires covered vast swathes of territory around the world,
including virtually the entire continent of Africa, demonstrates that empire
encompassed plenty of territory that held no valuable raw materials whatsoever.
Moreover, there were other economic drivers of imperialism – such as capturing
economic spheres of influence, establishing privileged trading zones from which
one could exclude one’s economic rivals and taxing local populations. Nor
should we discount indirect economic motivations that were folded into the
strategic rationale for territorial expansion, such as controlling lines of communi-
cation and consolidating territorial buffer zones for colonies that were more
economically valuable.
While peacekeeping and peacebuilding may not guarantee effective access to
primary commodities, this is not to say that such operations have no economic
value. The ordering functions of peacebuilding are widely understood to reduce
the costs of war in terms of the blood and treasure lost to conflict, as well as
the general disruption to regional trade, investment and commerce. The UN
itself defends peacekeeping on this basis. If the global deployment of peacekeep-
ing operations does not map precisely onto the known deposits of strategic or
valuable raw materials around the world, it does not mean that there is no econ-
omic rationale for peacekeeping. In broad terms, peacebuilding operations help to
reintegrate conflict-torn societies into the global economy as part of consolidating
the wider ‘liberal peace’. The imperial character of such efforts need not be
restricted to extracting valuable raw materials, but also resides in the fact that
such operations restrict the range of economic policies and options available to
post-conflict societies.21
The Modalities of Peacebuilding
Multilateralism is frequently cited in the literature as an attribute of peacebuild-
ing operations that expunges any residual or lingering traces of imperialism.
While the logic underpinning such claims often varies or is left unspecified, it
appears that multilateralism is seen to provide a check on the pursuit of national
self-interest in these operations. The assumption seems to be therefore that to
count as imperialism, such operations have to be mounted in the exclusive inter-
ests of a single state. Multilateralism here designates not only the diverse range of
countries that contribute to peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations, but also
the diversity of institutions involved in peacebuilding operations at the global

























level. Doyle and Sambanis for example, argue that the UN’s ‘mere presence guar-
antees that partial national interests are not in control’, and that the UN ethos of
multilateral impartiality, state equality and universal human rights ‘make the
quasi-colonial presence that a multidimensional peace operation entails not
only tolerable but effective’.22 Marten strongly emphasizes these claims: ‘[m]ulti-
lateralism is the one thing that removes any hint of individual state gain from
what might otherwise appear to be a colonial effort’.23
Yet the notion that multilateralism is incompatible with imperialism is not
borne out by even the most cursory survey of imperial history. Eric Ouellet
cites the suppression of the so-called ‘Boxer Uprising’ in China by the Eight-
Nation Alliance at the turn of the twentieth century as an example of ‘multilateral
counter-insurgency’ with lessons for Western-led multinational military
expeditions today.24 Indeed such examples of imperial interventions and colonial
policing are cited as historical precursors of peacekeeping in the leading textbook
on the subject, without ostensibly being seen to call into question the validity or
integrity of peacebuilding today.25 There are other examples of ‘multinational
imperialism’. The Ottoman empire was often subject to such interventions as
the great powers sought collectively to manage Turkish imperial decline.26
Albania was collectively established by the great powers as an international pro-
tectorate in 1913, in order to help secure imperial interests in the Balkans (Erwin
Schmidl even takes the Albanian protectorate as a model for international pacifi-
cation in the Balkans today).27
One noteworthy aspect of the intervention in Shanghai was that the majority
of ‘British’ troops sent to crush the Boxer rebellion were in fact from Britain’s
Indian army.28 The army of the Raj often acted as Britain’s imperial ‘fire
brigade’ – a metaphor also used for UN peacekeeping – helping to buttress
British rule from China to Africa.29 Lord Salisbury called British India ‘an
English barrack in the Oriental Seas from which we may draw any number of
troops without paying for them’.30 It is no exaggeration to call the successor
states of the Raj – India, Pakistan and Bangladesh – a UN barracks, given the
extent to which South Asia contributes to current peacekeeping. Where does
this leave questions of the multinational make-up of many peacebuilding oper-
ations? We shall return to this theme below.
Of course today peacebuilding multilateralism is institutionalized through the
UN rather than through episodic great power cooperation. But to assume that
imperial interests cannot be secured through the machinery of the UN would
be naı¨ve. As Paris himself concedes, UN missions ‘still reflect the interests of
the world’s most powerful countries’.31 To all intents and purposes the Security
Council controls UN peacekeeping operations in all their fundamental aspects,
led in large measure by its permanent bloc of three Western states – the United
States, UK and France. Furthermore, UN peacekeeping is overwhelmingly
financed by Western states.32 The lack of influence that poorer troop- and
police-contributing countries hold over the direction and purpose of UN peace-
keeping is repeatedly emphasized by these countries, as shown in an open
debate on peacekeeping held in the Security Council in August 2011. In this


























outsourcing exercise, in which developed countries contracted lower-cost troops
from developing countries to do the hard and dangerous work’.33
Going further, in certain instances multilateralism is the guarantee that imper-
ial interests can be secured. Consider the 1960–64 UN Operation in Congo,
known by its French acronym ONUC. If on the one hand the UN mission suc-
ceeded in preserving the territorial integrity of the Congolese state by suppressing
those secessionists supported by European mining interests, on the other it also
helped deliver the Congo to US imperial influence during the cold war. The
United States recognized that in the circumstances of Third World anti-colonial
revolt, direct intervention in Congo was politically impossible, and that stabiliz-
ation would have to be achieved through reliance on the proxy of UN peace-
keepers. As detailed by Inis Claude Jr.:
[T]he major theme [of official American commentary] was that ONUC
served the interests of the whole world by helping the major powers
avoid a collision in the Congo. But a significant counter-theme was
woven into the composition: the United Nations action in the Congo was
a means of giving the West a victory over the Soviet bloc that it might not
have been able to win for itself.34
ONUC shows that if multilateralism contributes legitimacy to international mili-
tary expeditions, it does not necessarily nullify their imperial character – multi-
lateralism can justify imperialism. Yet, if the range of states on which
peacekeeping draws (particularly as the majority come from poor and developing
countries) is taken as an argument against imperialism, this takes us back to the
question of the national composition of peacebuilding missions. The fact that UN
peacekeeping is not simply ‘re-hatting’ the military deployments of rich and
powerful states is taken as evidence that it is not imperialistic. According to
Cynthia Enloe ‘the United Nations peacekeeping forces, drawn from the mili-
taries of its member states, are being looked upon by the governments of many
industrialized and Third World countries as offering the best hope for a genuinely
post-Cold War, nonimperialist military’.35
In her survey of early post-cold war peacekeeping Laura Neack argues that
one way to ensure that peacekeeping served the interests of the ‘international
community’ rather than the self-interest of mandating states would be if peace-
keeping was democratized and broadened beyond the Western powers and the
narrow range of neutralist, middle powers that dominated peacekeeping during
the cold war.36 Neack’s injunction has since been realized, as Andrea Talentino
points out: ‘[a]nother argument against imperialism derives from the fact that
states of all types promote intervention, not simply the most powerful. Indeed,
if intervention relied primarily on Western or American participation it
would rarely happen at all’.37 As the data on the UN peacekeeping website
attest, peacekeepers are diverse, with the overwhelming majority coming from
poor developing countries.
But why should this distinguish peacekeeping from imperialism? As the
experience of the Raj suggests, historically imperialism has relied on multiracial
and multinational soldiery serving imperial centres of power. All the major

























imperial powers recruited forces from their colonies, and during the world wars
the British and French colonial forces grew into mass armies millions strong.
Drawing on such forces expanded the pools of manpower available to imperial
states in their rivalries with each other. It also helped to cement imperial rule in
peacetime by allowing metropolitan powers to garrison their colonies with indi-
genous rather than foreign troops. Colonial armies could also be deployed to
remote areas without the need to involve European soldiers in protracted conflicts
that might induce war-weariness at home. As Lord Salisbury suggested, from the
imperial vantage point one key advantage of colonial troops was their relative
cheapness. Colonial armies could be paid less than white metropolitan soldiery
and cost less to maintain. As they were most often only expected to fight
against technologically inferior opponents in low intensity conflicts, they did
not require modern weaponry. Each soldier in the British Indian Army cost
one-quarter of what it took to maintain a British soldier. At the turn of the twen-
tieth century a tirailleur se´ne`galais in French West Africa cost less than half of
what it took to maintain a white French marine infantryman.38 But also, more
simply, subaltern lives were less important to metropolitan power centres.
Such themes are strongly echoed in peacekeeping and peacebuilding today:
one constant refrain in Western public discourse is that of a ‘bargain’. According
to Susan Rice, UN ambassador for the Obama administration, for every dollar the
United States spends on unilateral stabilization efforts the UN spends only 12
cents. ‘That is a pretty good deal’ she told the US Senate in her confirmation
hearing.39 Part of the reason that UN peacekeeping is cheaper is due to UN legiti-
macy: the nominally consensual character of UN peacekeeping means that inter-
national peacekeeping forces need not fight their way into countries or hold
territory – activities that would require more manpower and larger outlays on
weaponry as well as air supremacy and perhaps naval support. But the lower
costs of UN peacekeeping and its intensified version, peacebuilding, can be attrib-
uted to the fact that its operations rely on the cheaper armed forces of poorer,
often formerly colonized countries. According to Richard Gowan, a NATO
soldier costs five times more to deploy than a UN peacekeeper.40
The diversity of nations involved in contemporary peacebuilding and peace-
keeping only seems striking on the assumption that international relations is com-
posed simply of the interaction of nation-states. If we broaden the scope of
international history to include empires, then the unified coordination of large
multinational armies around the globe from a single centre would appear a less
novel and cosmopolitan phenomenon. As Darryl Li has pointed out, the regimen-
tal history of some armies of post-colonial states goes straight from recounting
their participation in imperial campaigns to participation in UN peacekeeping
operations as the forces of freshly independent states.41 While today’s peace-
keepers represent independent states rather empires, it need not follow that
imperial power relations have been entirely superseded. As Tarak Barkawi and
Mark Laffey argue: ‘imperial states and empires typically constitute significant
coercive power from colonized and client populations and that force is integral
to processes of globalization’.42 Determining the scope of imperial power is


























of peacekeeping? As noted above, defenders of liberal peacebuilding themselves
admit the degree of control Western states have over international institutions.
Doyle notes the multi-layered power relations of British imperial rule and its
reliance on indigenous forces and local power structures for its perpetuation.
He suggests these as models for military intervention and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion today:
Over the longer run, indigenous forces such as the political zamindars and
the King’s Own African Rifles and other locally recruited military battalions
(not metropolitan troops) were the forces that made imperial rule effective,
that preserved a balance of local power in favour of metropolitan influence
– and that kept it cheap.43
The practice of contemporary peacebuilding – particularly its emphasis on devel-
opmentalism and reconstruction – is also visible in the record of colonialism. Not
unlike peacebuilding operations today, many multinational imperial interven-
tions were not purely military. International administrations in Tangier and
Shanghai enjoyed a multinational gendarmerie, complete with white police offi-
cers and reserve military units to enforce their rule. These expeditions also saw
foreign-led administrative and judicial functions superimposed over local
power structures.44 Importantly, many of these interventions were decided
through collective agreement and with extensive cooperation among the great
powers. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams cite the 1885 Congress of Berlin
at which the great powers divided up Africa between them, as a precursor of
UN transitional administrations today.45
Finally, one remaining significant attribute of peacebuilding that is held to dis-
tinguish it from imperialism is the former’s consensual nature. Paris stresses that it
is only rarely that peacekeepers deploy without the express consent of the host
state or of belligerent parties.46 They do not fight their way into countries or
mount campaigns of conquest.
Two points can be made. First, how substantial is the consent offered in peace-
building operations? With missions increasingly deployed under the terms of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter – terms that empower peacekeepers with
greater recourse to force – the meaning of consent has correspondingly narrowed.
The mechanisms through which consent has been extracted have also been
restructured. According to Es¸ref Aksu, the meaning of consent in UN peacekeep-
ing has been crimped to a narrow, formalistic shell:
In several cases, as in Central America and Mozambique, comprehensive
peace plans and agreements. . . extracted parties’ consent not only for the
initial UN deployment, but also for subsequent UN activities in the field.
By carefully placing the peacekeeping mandate on peace accords, inter-
national actors increasingly downplayed the requirement of seeking
consent at every stage of the operation.47
What does consent mean if it cannot be revoked, but is only extracted on a one-
time basis? If consent is only extracted once, particularly in relation to a compre-
hensive peace agreement, it means that a greater range of externally driven

























changes can be mounted throughout a host country, without requiring the formal
invocation of consent again.
The second point is the assumption that consent is incompatible with empire.
As a type of political order, empire is rightly understood as the opposite of auton-
omy and self-determination, the bases on which consent can be offered. Yet
consent can also be nominal, bogus, manipulated or exercised in such restricted
conditions as to be effectively meaningless. Certainly neo-imperial theorists
have little trouble accommodating voluntarism and varying degrees of circum-
scribed ‘consent’ into their visions of empire.
Former British diplomat and EU foreign policy envoy Robert Cooper speaks
of a ‘new liberal imperialism’ that involves stratification of the international
order. This order is crowned by enlightened, ‘postmodern’ states which have
renounced instincts of conquest and are bound by international cooperation, con-
trasted with ‘modern’ states selfishly focused only on their own interests, and a
morass of ‘premodern’ states with no stable authority structures. The last
group needs order implanted into them by postmodern imperialists in order to
prevent the spread of disorder. According to Cooper, this is ‘an imperialism
which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which
rests today on the voluntary principle’.48
Ignatieff describes contemporary imperialism ‘as an empire lite’, a ‘hegemony
without colonies’, a ‘global sphere of influence without the burden of direct
administration and the risks of daily policing’.49 Much like Cooper, Ignatieff
sees the target of imperialism to be ‘a vacuum of chaos and massacre’, emanating
security threats that draw in reluctant outsiders to impose stability through
imperial order.50 Ignatieff too sees consent as integral to this project, harkening
back to the experience of the British Empire: ‘[w]hat the history of the British
Empire shows is that self-determination and imperial rule are not incompatible. . .
promising self-government has always served as a key instrument in maintaining
control’.51
Ignatieff and Cooper largely restrict their discussion of modern imperialism to
Western-led and ‘post-conquest’ peacebuilding efforts: Cooper is primarily con-
cerned with EU nation-building efforts in the Balkans, while Ignatieff sees his
‘humanitarian empire’ in the mixture of peacebuilding initiatives in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Yet by the criteria offered by Cooper
and Ignatieff, UN post-settlement peacebuilding would offer the model of a
more successful imperium, in so far as it has undertaken efforts in a wider
variety of countries more consistently since the end of the cold war. Much like
the visions offered by Cooper and Ignatieff, UN peacebuilding operations have
helped to produce ‘sub-sovereign’ states locked into international institutions
that help to control remote zones of instability on the periphery of great
powers’ concerns.
Summary
Summarising the discussion so far, the first point to note is that the imperialism
against which peacekeeping and peacebuilding are favourably compared is under-


























peacekeeping is an aspect of contemporary international affairs, one might
assume that contemporary rather than historical discussions of imperialism
would be the most useful resource from which to mount a comparison. Yet this
is not the case: discussions about the dynamics of imperial power today are
simply ignored in these discussions of peacebuilding, despite the extent and theor-
etical sophistication of many discussions of imperialism in the contemporary
international relations literature. Indeed, no theories of imperialism – historical
or contemporary – are engaged with in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding lit-
erature, nor is any of the complex historiography regarding the nature and
purpose of imperial expansion. One could argue that the terms of the debate
have been weighted in favour of peacebuilding because imperialism is understood
to be something that belongs to history rather than being of the present.
But to go further, even by the standards of historical comparison, the discus-
sion of imperialism in peacekeeping studies is remarkably limited. It could be said
that each of the arguments discussed above sets up a caricature of imperialism, the
easier to cut it down. Of all the claims made for peacekeeping, among the most
important is that multilateralism signals the absence of selfish motivation. The
absence of private benefits from peacebuilding operations monopolistically accru-
ing to a single imperial state allows analysts to accept the universalistic rhetoric
that accompanies peacebuilding operations.
Intention then, seems to be the main measure of the legitimacy of peacebuild-
ing. But why is intention the standpoint for assessing the legitimacy of a particular
political practice? The legitimacy of the practice seems to be proved negatively:
peacebuilding is legitimate not because of what it is, but because of what it is
not (classical nineteenth century imperialism). Not only is this not a positive
case for peacebuilding, it could be read as an evasion of the very question of stan-
dards of assessment.
Imperial Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding can be seen as imperial in the way in which it restricts the range of
options available to post-conflict societies. Paris for example is sensitive to the
way in which the choices made by peacekeepers impose ‘relatively narrow
limits on the type of polity and economy that will be allowed to emerge’
(though he is willing to countenance such authoritarianism).52 It is true of
course in the formal sense that, if the activities of national governments are
absorbed by the UN, this will tend to ‘crowd out’ the room for ‘indigenous’
and ‘participatory’ activities by people in the host state. Any technical, externally
imposed programme will tend to reduce the scope for innovation and political
creativity in the work of building post-conflict institutions.
Yet in so far as imperialism and peacekeeping operations are historically dis-
tinct, it is not clear that these differences make peacebuilding a preferable form of
international intervention. To be sure, peacekeepers are not deployed to annex
territory to metropolitan states. Even in the most extreme instances of ‘proxy gov-
ernance’, where UN viceroys have substituted for local rulers such as in Cambo-
dia, Kosovo and East Timor, the aim has not been to snuff out the formal

























independence of these territories for good. But for that very reason, one could
argue that peacebuilding operations constitute a more insidious exercise of
imperial power. The old aspects of imperialism – colonies, mandates,
trusteeships – were all based on the recognition that external rule and tutelage
were incompatible with self-determination – hence the explicit revocation of
self-determination put off as a glittering goal for a distant future. Peacebuilding
by contrast is predicated on the notion that ‘proxy governance’ is compatible
with substantive national independence, and that the machinery of
government can be annexed by ‘internationals’ without prejudice to the practice
of self-determination.
How are political structures of responsibility and accountability to be estab-
lished under such circumstances? When it is more difficult to attribute political
responsibility, then a situation arises that was eloquently described (appropriately
enough) by the former UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
from 2000 to 2008, Jean-Marie Gue´henno, thus:
There [is] not a statue. . . to pull down from its pedestal, only the amorphous
mass of a diffuse and imperceptible power. The new order makes policemen
of us all, and there is no longer a police chief against whom we may direct
our revolt. We are deprived not of liberty, but of the idea of liberty.53
But the problem lies not only in the fact that peacebuilding is insinuated into the
operation of nominally independent states, but also with the justification given
for the political choices made in peacebuilding – the dissemination of pre-given
techniques and standards. Gue´henno argues that ‘[t]here are no longer great
decisions from which proceed lesser ones. . .. [and] traditional political debate,
a debate about principles and general ideas, an ideological debate, a debate
over how society is to be organised, fades away, or rather crumbles’.54 Peace-
building by its nature is based on the acceptance of a distinctive set of political
institutions and values – those of the liberal peace.
Rather than facilitating mediation and resolution between competing political
or national projects, the UN now facilitates conformity with one political order,
the ‘liberal peace’: liberal government and market society. This consensus is taken
to be beyond challenge: economic, legal and political models of governance that
are all so well established and entrenched that they are assumed to be self-
evidently good and enjoy universal support, thereby obviating the need for
assent. In this way, decisions about political order and social organization are
assumed to be a given. As Gue´henno argues, ‘It matters little whether a norm is
imposed. . . by a committee of bureaucrats. It is no longer the expression of a
sovereignty, but simply something that reduces uncertainties, a means of lowering
the costs of transactions, of increasing transparence [sic]’.55
UN Peacebuilding and Modern Imperialism
Empire remains, therefore, a remarkably under-utilized concept in the study of
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Although Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri


























nation states is scaled up into Empire, the nebulous categories of their thin theory
do not easily meld with the reality of peacebuilding operations.56 As Alejandro
Cola´s points out, peacebuilding operations are focused on rearticulating a decen-
tralized international order based around independent states, not dissolving states
into a transnational political order.57 Although David Chandler by contrast
addresses state-building directly as a new type of imperial politics, he does not
specifically differentiate between post-conquest and post-settlement peacebuild-
ing, and focuses on state- and EU-led rather than UN-led peacebuilding
operations.58
If we examine the scholarly literature on imperialism, the most obvious defin-
ing feature that recurs is the existence of a hierarchical relation between distinct
political units, with asymmetric power relations that effectively restrict the auton-
omy of the subordinated society. This unequal relationship can be formally con-
stituted via institutions that ensure that the subordinate society is directly ruled by
the political institutions of the imperial state, or via informal power relations –
whereby the subordinate society is nominally independent but where crucial
policy questions are determined in a sustained and systematic fashion by the
imperial state.59
Empires may adopt inclusionary or exclusionary strategies in their relations
with local elites. In his classic study of empire, Doyle stresses the varieties of
imperial and informal political dependence as achieved variously through force,
collaboration or non-political forms of dependence (economic, social or
cultural).60 Moreover, imperial power structures typically involve a variegated
hierarchy, with imperial power centres enjoying heterogeneous relations with
different types of subordinate societies, the better to disable collective action or
self-organization by the subordinated societies.61
UN peacebuilding fits both the visions of international order offered by neo-
imperialist theorists and the broad characterizations of empire offered in the
academic literature on the topic as synthesized above. Empire is thus a fruitful
device for understanding the dynamics of peacekeeping in the international
order today, and on the basis of the current literature, there is no reason not to
read peacekeeping against the backdrop of empire and imperial history. A
decade ago Paris argued that the study of peacekeeping would be enriched by
being plugged into mainstream discussion of international relations and inter-
national relations theorizing.62 Today the study of peacekeeping and peace-
building would benefit no less from drawing on the theoretical and historical
discussion of imperial power in international affairs.
Conclusion
Almost by default, the expansion of peacebuilding in the contemporary world
spontaneously conjures up the spectre of imperialism: peacekeepers are sent to
pacify unruly but ultimately marginal territories, using deterrence and force,
and propagating ideals and institutions that are consonant with the values
espoused by the most powerful members of the international system. The simi-
larities cannot be ignored. The purpose of this article was not to argue that

























peacebuilding and historical imperialism are perfectly symmetrical; rather that
the existing attempts in the literature to differentiate peacebuilding from imperi-
alism, and thereby legitimate the former, are weak and unconvincing.
That it is fairly straight-forward to puncture the claims made for the suppo-
sedly post-imperial character of peacebuilding shows that the extant discussion
in peacekeeping studies is not particularly rigorous or well informed. It also
suggests that if peacebuilding can indeed be conceptually assimilated to a long
history of imperial practice in international politics, it also represents a refined
form of imperialism, whereby extensive international influence over, and pen-
etration of, domestic political systems is not seen as mutually exclusive of
self-determination.
As we have seen, the use of the imperial analogy in peacekeeping studies
deploys a crude construct as a stand-in for imperialism, ignoring the suppleness
and versatility of imperial domination in world politics, as well as the broad
range of theories used to study it. If peacebuilding would benefit from a more sys-
tematic and rigorous engagement with theories of empire, the converse is equally
true: the study of peacebuilding would help broaden debates about contemporary
imperialism, forcing scholars and students of modern empire to cast their gaze
further than the machinations of US power, and to consider the rise of imperial
multilateralism and the institutions it deploys. In so far as UN interventions
and post-settlement peacebuilding initiatives still accrue greater legitimacy than
unilateral interventions and post-conquest peacebuilding, it is high time that
the former was subject to greater scrutiny.
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